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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Senate passed its annual defense funding bill, the
National Defense Authorization Act, with a provision that would require women to register with the Selective Service.1 Senator John
McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, strongly supported the measure.2 Although the amendment was defeated in
the House of Representatives, it received backing from the House
Armed Services Committee.3 At the same time, lawsuits filed in Cali* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy, West
Point. The author is a former active duty Army Judge Advocate. Many thanks to Lieutenant
Colonel Christopher Jacobs and Lieutenant Colonel Winston Williams for helpful comments
and suggestions. The views expressed here are the author’s personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the United States Army, the United States
Military Academy, or any other department or agency of the United States government.
1. S. 2943, 114th Cong. § 591 (as passed by Senate, June 14, 2016); see Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Votes to Require Women to Register for the Draft, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/us/politics/congress-women-military-draft.html?_r=0.
2. Senator John McCain stated, “The fact is . . . every single leader in this country,
both men and women, members of the military leadership, believe that it’s fair since we
opened up all aspects of the military to women that they would also be registering for [the]
Selective Service.” Steinhauer, supra note 1.
3. Nicholas Clairmont, The Unseemly Death of an Amendment to Draft Women,
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/theunlikely-birth-and-unseemly-death-of-an-amendment-to-draft-americas-women/483599/
[https://perma.cc/TKJ9-PWWF]. California Republican Duncan Hunter, a strong opponent
of women serving in combat roles, originally proposed the amendment. He then voted
against his own proposal. Id.
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fornia and New Jersey challenged the continued constitutionality of
the all-male Selective Service law as it currently stands.4
From an equal rights perspective, the exclusion of women from
Selective Service registration places an undue burden on men, who
not only face forcible conscription but a myriad of criminal and civil
penalties for failing to register.5 From a feminist viewpoint, the
current law may be seen as a government-endorsed affirmation that
women must be shielded from the obligations of full participation in
civic life, justifying unequal treatment in American society.6 The renewed wave of interest in the Selective Service system, both in the
political and legal arenas, largely springs from the implementation of
the new Pentagon policy to allow women to fill combat roles, ending
the so-called combat exclusion rule.7
Undoubtedly, the lifting of the combat exclusion policy will have
significant ramifications on a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause8
analysis of the male-only Military Selective Service Act (MSSA or the
Act).9 Ultimately, however, the Pentagon’s decision to open combat
roles to women will not be totally dispositive in a legal challenge to
the Act. As this Article explores, the degree of judicial deference
granted to Congress and the military on the question of women’s exclusion from the draft will play an essential role in future judicial
review of the Act.

4. See Kristina Davis, Suit Over Women in the Draft Back in Action, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sdutwomen-register-draft-9th-circuit-opinion-2016feb19-story.html [http://perma.cc/8CGPFHHL]; Ilya Somin, Lawsuit Challenges Constitutionality of Male-Only Draft Registration,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/15/lawsuit-challenges-constitutionality-of-male-only-draftregistration/?utm_term=.3c88c81b23e4 [https://perma.cc/689M-7HPH]. The first lawsuit
was filed by the National Coalition for Men; the second by a teenage girl and her mother—both
claiming that the Military Selective Service Act unconstitutionally discriminates based on sex.
5. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
6. See Linda K. Kerber, “A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . . . Ladies”: Women, Civic Obligation and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 119-23;
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 293-94 (1984).
7. Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y of Def., on Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Dempsey Memorandum],
https://www.defense.gov/news/WISRJointMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M9N-X6WY]. The
decision was announced in 2013 by then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and fully implemented within the armed services on January 1, 2016.
8. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to
preclude the federal government from denying persons equal protection under the law,
effectively incorporating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
9. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3820 (2012).
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This Article begins with a brief historical overview of the MSSA
and the 1981 Supreme Court case Rostker v. Goldberg,10 in which the
Court upheld the Act against a due process challenge. The Rostker
decision has faced widespread criticism for its constitutional analysis.11 Indeed, the level of deference granted to Congress regarding the
exclusion of women was remarkable, and many scholars agree that
this degree of deference ultimately overcame a probing and meaningful due process analysis by the Court.12 Next, this Article briefly examines the Supreme Court’s history of using judicial deference in
military-related cases. Most important for a future legal challenge,
however, is the recent trend in the Court’s jurisprudence. This Article
then explores recent cases in which the government argued for military deference and the Court’s evolving approach to these cases. Finally, focusing on precedent in the last fifteen years, beginning with
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) cases and going through First
Amendment challenges from recent terms, this Article attempts to set
a framework of deference for a modern-day challenge to the MSSA.
II. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
During the Civil War, President Lincoln signed the Enrollment
Act,13 marking the first time the federal government required compulsory military service of able-bodied males.14 Congress has enacted
multiple draft laws since that time, resulting in the conscripted service of over 16 million American men during twentieth-century conflicts alone.15 The current draft registration law, the MSSA, was
passed by Congress in 1967.16 Conscription for the Vietnam conflict
ended in 1973, however, and mandatory registration ended in 1975,
effectively putting the Selective Service Registration System into
standby mode.17
Prompted by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
President Carter called for the reactivation of the draft registration
10. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). As the Rostker Court inexorably linked the requirement to
register with the actual requirement for conscripted service, this Article does the same.
11. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
13. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
14. KRISTY N. KAMARCK, CONG. RES. SERV., R44452, THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
AND DRAFT REGISTRATION: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2016).
15. Induction Statistics, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/About/HistoryAnd-Records/Induction-Statistics [https://perma.cc/MAA6-UYCY] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018)
(providing total induction numbers for each conflict when the United States used the
draft). The estimated numbers include 2.8 million servicemen in World War I, 10.1 million
in World War II, 1.5 million in Korea, and 1.8 million in Vietnam. Id.
16. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-400, 81 Stat. 100 (1967).
17. KAMARCK, supra note 14, at 11.
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process.18 He asked Congress to fund the reactivation of the Selective
Service System and also recommended that Congress amend the
MSSA to allow the registration and conscription of women.19 After
holding lengthy hearings that included testimony from multiple
Pentagon officials, Congress agreed that it was appropriate to reactivate the draft registration process.20 The funding amount allocated by
Congress was significantly less than requested by President Carter,
however, as Congress determined that only males should be included
in registration.21 The MSSA has been amended several times since its
inception, but its essential requirement, that males between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-six register for the draft, remains.22
A. Rostker v. Goldberg (1981)
Shortly after the renewal of the registration process, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Rostker, which presented a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause challenge to the MSSA. The district court
struck down the law, finding that contrary to Congress’s official findings and the arguments proffered by the government, the bulk of military congressional testimony showed that women’s inclusion in draft
registration would further the military’s interest, not detract from
it.23 In that way, the lower court found that the government failed to
18. President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1980),
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml
[https://perma.cc/85JL-3V8E].
19. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 60 (1981).
20. Id. at 61 (citing H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 94 Stat. 552 (1980)).
21. Id. (first citing S. REP. NO. 96-789, at 1-2 (1980); then citing 126 CONG. REC.
13,895 (1980) (statement of Sen. Nunn)).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 3802(a) (2012). The law states, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be the duty of every male
citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United
States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and
submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such
manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules
and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Id. It goes on to state that:
The President is authorized, from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists, to select and induct into the Armed Forces of the United States for training
and service in the manner provided in this chapter (including but not limited to
selection and induction by age group or age groups) such number of persons as
may be required to provide and maintain the strength of the Armed Forces.
Id. § 3083(a).
23. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The district court also
found it problematic that Congress displayed conflicting positions on women’s usefulness in
the military. At the same time as it continued to increase funding to recruit more women

2017]

UNEQUAL LAW, UNEQUAL BURDEN

141

show an important government interest in the all-male law, as required by an intermediate scrutiny gender discrimination analysis.24
In doing so, the district court plainly rejected a deferential treatment
of Congress’s contrary factual findings.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the district court’s approach
and noted that particular deference was due to the determinations of
Congress in the area of military affairs.25 Relying heavily on the legislative reports, the Court concluded that Congress reasonably and
constitutionally excluded women from draft registration plans. Explaining the correct standard of review to apply to the case, the Court
stated that Congress’s determination in regard to the single-sex draft
registration decision deserved dual layers of deference—in addition
to the deference normally accorded congressional determinations,
issues concerning national defense and military affairs deserved the
highest level of deference from the Court.26 Tracing Congress’s powers to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution—including the authority to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and
make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces27—
the Court categorized such powers as “broad and sweeping.”28
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the judiciary itself largely
lacked competence in the area of military affairs.29
into the armed forces, Congress simultaneously passed legislation to exclude them from
conscripted service. Id. Following the district court decision, the Director of the Selective
Service, Bernard Rostker, filed a notice of appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Justice Brennan, acting as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, stayed the order. See
Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1311 (1980). Soon after, the Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980).
24. Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at 605 (citing the “important interest” standard from Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). In Craig, the challenged state law prohibited men aged 1820, but not women, from purchasing low-alcohol beer. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92. The Court,
applying intermediate scrutiny, determined that the law violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 208-09. Although the state showed an important interest in lowering alcohol-related traffic incidents, that purpose was not sufficiently
related to the discriminatory law, despite an arguable numeric correlation showing a greater
likelihood of men being involved in traffic incidents. Id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. In describing the framework of deference to Congress’s findings, and the resulting
rejection of the district court’s analysis, Justice Rehnquist stated, “[W]e must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our
own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.” Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981).
26. Id. at 64-65 (“The case arises in the context of Congress’s authority over national
defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress
greater deference.”).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
28. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
29. Id. at 65-66 (“[It] is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially pro-
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The Court’s reasoning in upholding the law was ultimately rooted
in the long-standing prohibition against women serving in combat
roles. Congressional testimony established that in a draft-time scenario, the military’s greatest personnel need would be combat
troops.30 Noting the statutory restrictions and executive policy preventing women from filling such roles, Justice Rehnquist, therefore
concluded that women and men were not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or draft registration.31 For this reason, Congress’s
registration plans were sufficiently related to the stated purpose in
authorizing registration.32 Under this line of reasoning, an analysis of
the underlying policy of excluding women generally from combat was
unnecessary. The policy of excluding women from combat roles thus
became a proxy for the Court and allowed it to avoid examining the
MSSA on the fundamental basis of gender exclusion.
There were significant differences in how the Supreme Court and
the district court evaluated the legislative findings. In overturning
the MSSA as unconstitutional, the district court was persuaded by
military testimony before Congress which revealed that in an anticipated draft of 650,000 personnel, the military could absorb 80,000
females to fill noncombat roles.33 Conversely, the Supreme Court noted that even assuming women could be drafted to fill some noncombat roles, Congress had found that including women in registration
and the draft was not “worth the added burdens.”34 Citing congressional findings that military training would be unnecessarily hampered, the Court also did not find merit in the proposition that all
women could be registered, but only a small percentage actually inducted in a draft.35 Moreover, the Court noted that Congress had estimated that female volunteers would fill the available slots in a
fessional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10
(1973))). The Court went on to quote Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953):
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army . . . [t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of
the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous
not to intervene in judicial matters.
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 71.
30. Id. at 76 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 160 (1980)).
31. Id. at 78.
32. Id. at 79.
33. Id. at 80-81.
34. Id. at 81.
35. Id. The Court also cited the Senate Committee Report which acknowledged other
administrative problems, including difficulties related to housing, treatment of dependents,
and differences in physical standards. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 159).
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draft-time scenario.36 Perhaps most important for the Court, however, was Congress’s stated goal of military flexibility during wartime.
According to congressional findings, military units and personnel
must be available to fill both combat and noncombat roles, depending
on mission requirements.37 This fact would ostensibly make filling
those 80,000 noncombat roles with primarily women infeasible. As to
the argument that most military officials actually supported including women in the draft, the Court stated that Congress’s findings
showed that those officials who voiced support for including women
in registration did so out of “equity” concerns, rather than military
needs.38 In conclusion, the Court found that the district court had
erred in “undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence,
rather than adopting an appropriately deferential examination of
Congress’ evaluation of that evidence.”39
In his dissent, Justice Marshall took issue with the majority’s interpretation of congressional testimony. Justice Marshall noted that
contrary to Congress’s eventual exclusion of women from the MSSA,
the Department of Defense and all four military service chiefs had
unanimously advocated requiring women to register for the Selective
Service.40 He understood the congressional testimony regarding the
potential 80,000 female inductees that could be absorbed into the
military as having already accounted for the issue of military flexibility.41 In other words, women could fill those positions without negatively affecting military flexibility. Two other dissenting Justices, Justices White and Brennan, also agreed with this understanding of the
testimony.42 Substantial numbers of women could be utilized in a draft,
then, and there was an inadequate governmental basis for excluding
them. Ultimately for the dissenters, some women could fill some roles,
and that was a sufficient basis to include them in draft registration.
B. Criticism of Rostker
The Rostker decision, while enjoying popular support at the time,
has faced strong criticism from legal scholars.43 Particularly troubling
36. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 158 (1980)).
37. Id. at 81-82 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 158 (1980)).
38. Id. at 80 (first citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 158 (1980); and then 126 CONG. REC.
13,893 (1980) (statement of Sen. Nunn)).
39. Id. at 83 (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 100.
42. See id. at 83-113 (White, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 126 (2008) (stating that extrajudicial debate about women’s role in society and the military significantly influenced Justice
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was the Court’s overly deferential acceptance of Congress’s findings.44
For example, after examining the legislative testimony, the three dissenting Justices explicitly disagreed with Congress’s interpretation of
military flexibility vis-à-vis the 80,000 slots that could have been
filled by women.45 Not only was the record of the flexibility justification doubtful, but even viewed in Congress’s favor, exact details were
quite unclear.46 Although testimony did support the idea that service
members serving in support roles would sometimes have to use basic
combat skills, no clarification was made regarding the actual frequency of that occurrence or how often it would likely occur in the future.47
Perhaps most problematic was the Rostker Court’s unbridled acceptance of factual determinations made by Congress that were at
odds with military testimony. As emphasized in both dissents, the
Department of Defense itself and all four armed service chiefs had
recommended including women in the Selective Service.48 Moreover,
Congress’s portrayal of military testimony in support of women’s inclusion in the MSSA as based on “equity” concerns, rather than needs
of the military, was potentially misleading. The term “equity,” as
Congress used it and the majority later adopted, implied that by advocating women’s inclusion in Selective Service registration, the
Pentagon was merely bowing to political correctness.49 Instead,
the term was used by military officials during testimony to contrast

Rehnquist’s majority opinion); Wildman, supra note 6, at 293-94 (arguing that the Court
played a role in normalizing gender inequality by using Congress’s discriminatory findings
to justify its holding).
44. See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in
the Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 182 n.81 (1990) (arguing that
in Rostker, the Court utilized a highly deferential review which only paid “lipservice” to the
established standard of scrutiny for gender-based classifications); see also William A.
Kamens, Comment, Selective Disservice: The Indefensible Discrimination of Draft Registration, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (2003) (arguing that the Court did not use the accepted
gender-based classification scrutiny level for the case and actually shifted the burden of
proof to the plaintiff). See generally Ellen Oberwetter, Note, Rethinking Military Deference:
Male-Only Draft Registration and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian Rights, 78
TEX. L. REV. 173 (1999).
45. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 84 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 79-80 (majority opinion).
47. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1981: Hearing on S. 2294 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 96th Cong. 1390 (1980)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 2294] (statement of Lieutenant General Robert Yerks, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel) (testifying that past conflicts have necessitated military support personnel becoming involved in combat and that trend generally increased during
Vietnam). No clarifying questions were asked regarding projections for the actual number
of support troops who would face this risk in the future.
48. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83-84 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2294, supra note 47, at 1856 (statement of Richard Danzig,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).
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absolute military requirements.50 In other words, according to Pentagon officials, there were sufficient numbers of men to fill the ranks of
the military in the event of a draft. Therefore, women, while they
were valued members of the armed services and could certainly be
useful in many military roles, were technically not “necessary.” It
was due to “equity,” as opposed to absolute necessity, that the officials recommended women be included in the draft. Further, as Justice White noted in his dissent, there was a dearth of evidence on the
record to show that sufficient females would volunteer for military
service, thereby filling available “female” slots—a contention made by
Congress and also adopted by the majority.51

50. See, e.g., id. In one heated exchange, Senator Roger Jepsen repeatedly questioned
an Office of the Secretary of Defense official on whether it was essential that females be
registered:
Senator Jepsen. I cannot get a yes or no answer. Either we have a military
need or we don’t. That is what we are talking about when we talk about registration and draft, military need to protect the national security of this country
which we are mandated to provide in this country.
So, if there is a military need for registering women, we should do it. If
there is no military need for registering women—and you talk about social acceptance and a few other things in this country that for 204 years has made us
the country that we are—this won’t look good for the record—but, I fail to understand at all where you’re coming from.
I admit I am not at all objective nor am I about to be or will I ever be on
registering women. If you did not draft women, would you be unable to meet
the Department of Defense requirements with men?
Mr. Danzing. If we did not draft women, we could meet the Department of
Defense requirements with men.
Senator Jepsen. So, is there a military need to register women?
Mr. Danzig. Senator, let me suggest I think we can agree on the proposition
that security of the Republic does not rest on our capacity to draft women. If we
did not draft women, military needs could be met exclusively with men. If the
question is can women do things that are useful for military purposes, the answer is clearly yes. I think that we would both agree with that.
Senator Jepsen. Are you associating your advocacy of registering women
with the military need?
Mr. Danzig. I think that the case for registering women does not stem from a
need to have numbers of people to man the military forces of the United States.
Senator Jepsen. So, your advocacy for registering women has more to do
with equity in response to pushy groups at this time?
Id.
51. In fact, this conclusion is highly doubtful based on other testimony before Congress. During the 1981 appropriations bill testimony, Chairman Stennis asked General
Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army, if there had been any problems in recruiting
women. General Rogers admitted the Army fell short of its female recruitment goals. See
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearing on
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According to the precedent set in Craig v. Boren,52 the Court
should have used an intermediate scrutiny analysis for a gender discrimination claim.53 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government
must generally show that it has an important interest in the regulation and that the law at issue bears a substantial relationship to that
interest.54 Here, then, the government should have shouldered the
burden in showing that the exclusion of females from draft registration served an important interest and that the interest—in raising
and supporting military forces, maintaining readiness, preserving
national security, or other justification—was substantially related to
excluding women from registration. As the dissenters insinuated,
this would have been a highly difficult task.55 Parsing numbers aside,
the number of military roles that could have been filled by women in
a draft scenario was certainly not zero (or even close to zero). Therefore, registering and conscripting women would have in fact helped
further the government’s interest even if women could not have been
utilized at the same rate of male draftees. The only justification to
exclude women from registration would have been “administrative
convenience,” an inadequate justification in precedent military
cases.56
S. 428 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 96th Cong. 663 (1979) (statement of General
Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army).
52. 429 U.S. 190, 208-09, 218 (1976).
53. See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530, 532-34 (1996) (holding that
the all-male Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to
admit female applicants). In that case, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated
that the state must evince an “exceedingly persuasive justification” in a gender-based discrimination claim, ostensibly raising the bar for the government to successfully defend a
challenge based under equal protection. Id. at 524.
54. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
55. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83-85 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); id. at
90-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (holding that “administrative convenience” was not adequate justification for the military to require female, but
not male, service members to prove spousal dependency before being eligible for military
dependent benefits). Furthermore, as the Selective Service system is a separate entity from
the Department of Defense, the administrative burden of registering women, even if a certain proportion would not eventually be conscripted, would fall on the independently
funded agency, not the military. See About the Agency, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS.,
https://www.sss.gov/About [https://perma.cc/37CL-G4X2] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). Other
concerns cited by Congress during its hearings, including additional resources being necessary to build facilities—most likely barracks and bathrooms—for female recruits, should
also be considered under this “administrative convenience” category. See Rostker, 453 U.S.
at 81. In Rostker, the majority also accepted Congress’s finding that military training
would be burdened by processing and training women who could not be used in the war
effort. Id. This risk, if it did hold any merit, seems to be mitigated by the military’s new
Occupational Physical Assessment Test initiative, which is designed to adequately screen
all potential personnel for physical qualifications related to their anticipated military specialty. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Instead, however, the Court seemed to avoid this analysis entirely
by deeming men and women “not similarly situated” because of the
combat exclusion policy.57 Unfortunately, the Court failed to articulate exactly how it applied intermediate scrutiny in conjunction with
military deference. In fact, the Court’s highly deferential treatment
convinced some lower federal courts that the established intermediate scrutiny standard of review did not apply in military sexdiscrimination cases.58
C. Rostker and the Elimination of the Combat Exclusion
The Court has never readdressed the male-only draft registration
question. Changes in Pentagon policy since that time, however, have
significantly changed the landscape of gender roles in the military. In
2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the elimination of the military’s combat restrictions for females.59 The military
branches fully implemented the policy by January 2016, opening
approximately 220,000 jobs to female service members.60 Many have
argued that the Pentagon’s recent policy change to allow women into
combat positions has fatally undermined the analysis and holding in
Rostker.61 Given a healthy dose of deference by the Court, however, it
is not difficult to fathom how the government could attempt to justify
57. Justice Rehnquist cited Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), as justification for this categorization. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67. In Schlesinger, the Court considered a
due process challenge to a naval policy that allowed female officers more time than male
officers to gain promotion to the next highest rank, a necessary step in remaining in active
service. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 501-05. The Schlesinger Court held the policy to be constitutional because males and females were not similarly situated in naval service. The Court
reasoned that the “different treatment of men and women naval officers . . . reflects not
archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for
professional service.” Id. at 508. Because women were not eligible for combat or sea duty,
the policy was simply a reflection of the reality that female officers took longer to move up
the military ranks. See id. at 510 n.13.
58. As a result, these courts diverged from the scrutiny standard established by Craig
and appeared to use a markedly lower standard for gender inequality claims in military
cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. U.S. Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Based on
my reading of Rostker . . . I conclude that the standard outlined in Craig is not applicable
to gender-based equal protection claims raised in the context of military affairs . . . .”); Rogers, supra note 44, at 182 n.81.
59. Dempsey Memorandum, supra note 7.
60. Matthew Rosenberg & Dave Phillips, All Combat Roles Now Open to Women, Defense Secretary Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/
politics/combat-military-women-ash-carter.html?_r=0Dec. 3, 2015.
61. See, e.g., Russell Spivak & Adam Aliano, G.I. Jane and the Selective Service: Equal
Protection Challenges to Male-Only Selective Service in the Modern Military, HARV. J.
LEGIS. ONLINE NOTES (Aug. 5, 2016), http://harvardjol.com/2016/08/05/gi-jane-and-theselective-service-equal-protection-challenges-to-male-only-selective-service-in-the-modernmilitary/ [https://perma.cc/WU4D-CKZ7].
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the law’s continued constitutionality. In an argument to uphold the
MSSA, the government could submit that although almost all military positions are now available to women, they do not meet the
physical requirements of combat positions in high proportions.62
Therefore, following the reasoning in Rostker, women are not “similarly situated” with men because they would not be able to effectively
perform in combat positions that would become necessary to fill in a
draft-time scenario.63
As a threshold matter, if not for the precedent of Rostker, this
would be a difficult argument to sustain. Many senior military officials have recently given support to the inclusion of women in draft
registration plans. In a February 2016 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, two of the armed forces service chiefs agreed that
women should be included in Selective Service registration.64 There
62. As the military has only recently allowed women to fill roles within the combat
arms, no widespread data is currently available showing the attrition rate for females in
combat arms training. The U.S Army has recently started a program to physically screen
soldiers and officers before they enter training for their occupation-specific branch. The
Occupational Physical Assessment Test (OPAT) is a gender-neutral assessment tool designed to ensure soldiers meet the minimum physical requirements for their anticipated
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The physical standards were developed by testing
the capabilities of currently serving service members within those MOS categories. Currently in its diagnostic phase, the OPAT is anticipated to be an Army-wide accessions requirement by summer 2017. Interview with Major Dan Hayden, Dir. of Military Accessions, U.S. Military Acad., in West Point, N.Y. (Dec. 13, 2016). The ability of women to
successfully meet OPAT requirements among combat specialties would certainly be influential to future litigation.
63. Another possible basis of objection to including women in registration is the unequal rate at which women have sustained injuries in ground combat training, particularly
due to load bearing. See Memorandum from Ash Carter, Sec’y of Def. & Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Implementation Guidance for the Full Integration of Women in
the Armed Services (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
OSD014303-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC2L-7TAN]. Finally, Defense Secretary Ash Carter also
acknowledged the potential issues with female service members operating in cultural environments with allies and partners who are “culturally opposed to working with women.” Id.
64. The Implementation of the Decision to Open All Ground Combat Units to Women:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. 63-64 (2016) (statements of
General Robert Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Ray Mabus, Secretary of the
Navy; Patrick Murphy, Under Secretary of the Army; and General Mark Milley, Chief of
Staff of the Army). Interestingly, the civilian military leadership in attendance was less
supportive of the measure. Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, and acting Secretary of the
Army, Patrick Murphy, stated that there should be public debate on the issue. The relevant testimony included, in part:
Senator McCaskill. . . .
I think one of the questions we have to address now is registering for the selective service. As some of you may know, there was a Supreme Court decision
back in 1981 when in fact the question was put in front of the Supreme Court
whether women should be required to register for the Selective Service under
current law. Justice Rehnquist wrote, “the existence of combat restrictions clearly
indicates the basis for Congress’s decision to exempt women from registration.
The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since
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was no mention of the government’s important interest in “flexibility.” Moreover, support roles in the armed services greatly outnumber combat roles.65 Such support roles are in medical, logistics, engineering, aviation, intelligence, transportation, finance, and other
specialties.66 Women have been serving in these roles for years, effectively and with distinction. In fact, women now make up approxi-

women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded they would not be needed
in the event of a draft and therefore decided not to register them.” So in other
words, the rationale that Rehnquist used for saying there was no requirement of
women to register for the Selective Service has now been eliminated.
And I guess I want to ask all of you your sense of this. . . . And if you would
briefly go down the line and give me your sense as to whether or not Congress
should look at requiring selective service registration for all Americans.
General Neller. Senator, it is my personal view that based on this lifting of
restrictions for assignment to unit MOS, that every American who is physically
qualified should register for the draft.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I think you correctly pointed out this needs to be
looked at as part of a national debate, given the changed circumstances.
The one thing you did say, not selective service-related, but that we do believe that this will open up recruiting, that more women will be interested in—I
will just talk about the Marines—in the Marines because these last restrictions
have been removed.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Senator, I believe that, yes, there should be a national debate
and I encourage the legislative body to look at that. I would say that unlike the
decision in 1981 where we are now in the longest war in American history over
the last almost 15 years, that we have had over 1,000 women killed or injured
in combat. Now, with this implementation, if you can meet the standard, you
are on a team no matter what MOS it is. So I highly encourage that national
debate, ma’am.
....
Senator McCaskill. General Milley?
General Milley. Senator, I think that all eligible and qualified men and
women should register for the draft.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I do too. I think it is the right thing going forward.
Id. Secretary of the Air Force, Deborah Lee James, has also publicly voiced support for including women in draft plans. Richard Lardner, Air Force Secretary Supports Draft Registration for
Women, MILITARY.COM (June 4, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/06/04/air-forcesecretary-supports-draft-registration-women.html [https://perma.cc/6YCV-E5UP].
65. Among enlisted Army personnel, for instance, support troops outnumber combat
troops over 3:1. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Military
Careers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/military/military-careers.htm
[https://perma.cc/X6Z3-LVFH] (last updated Oct. 24, 2017).
66. See id.
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mately fifteen percent of the current active duty force.67 It is clear
that women, if included in draft registration plans, would perform
necessary and important functions in future conflicts if conscription
was necessary, adding to the overall effectiveness of military operations. Undeniably, there is no important interest gained by not including them, especially with low-cost physical screening measures in
place for filling combat roles.68 As seen in Rostker, however, the views
of Congress and arguments put forth by government counsel have
sometimes outweighed even the expert opinions of Pentagon officials.
Even with the lifting of the combat exclusion rule, any future legal
challenge to the MSSA will hinge on the Court’s use of deference.
III. MILITARY DEFERENCE
Undoubtedly, judicial deference to Congress’s findings played a
significant role in the Court’s holding in Rostker. Deference in military matters, in fact, occupies a noteworthy position in many historic
Supreme Court decisions concerning both military and national security issues. In an early case, Martin v. Mott,69 the Court considered a
challenge by a New York citizen who was conscripted for service in
the militia. The President authorized the conscription under a 1795
law which gave the Executive the power to call forth the militia
“whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent
danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe.”70
Congress passed the statute under its constitutional power to call
forth the militia in times of national need.71 After failing to obey his
conscription order, Mott was tried by court-martial.72 Mott later challenged his conviction on several grounds, most notably that the
President lacked authority under the statute to call forth the militia

67. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF., 2014 DEMOGRAPHICS: PROMILITARY COMMUNITY 18 (2014), http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/
MOS/Reports/2014-Demographics-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4938-45CW]. In 2014, there
were approximately 200,000 females on active duty in the various armed service branches,
out of a total of 1.3 million active duty personnel. The gender make-up varied substantially
between services, however. For example, women comprised almost 19% of the Air Force,
but less than 0.8% of the Marine Corps that year. Id. at 19-20.
68. See supra note 62. The argument to include women is especially persuasive considering approximately 75% of young Americans are ineligible to join the military because of obesity, lack of high school education, felony convictions, medical conditions, and appearance issues. See Miriam Jordan, Recruits’ Ineligibility Tests the Military, WALL ST. J. (June 27,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/recruits-ineligibility-tests-the-military-1403909945.
69. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
70. Id. at 28-29.
71. “To provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
72. Martin, 25 U.S. at 28.
FILE OF THE
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at that time because there was no imminent danger of invasion.73 The
Supreme Court rejected Mott’s contention under two main justifications. First was a consideration of the role of the judiciary in such a
case. Justice Story, writing for the unanimous Court, stated that military service carried the unique requirements of immediate obedience
to the decisions of the chain of command.74 Judicial interference with
these judgments, according to Story, would be dangerous and “subversive of all discipline.”75
The Court went on to state a second justification for rebuffing
Mott’s position. Judicial review was unwarranted in the case because
of separation of powers considerations and the fact that the Executive possessed unique expertise in the area of national security:
[I]n many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is imminent danger of invasion, might be of a nature not constituting strict technical proof, or the disclosure of the
evidence might reveal important secrets of state, which the public
interest, and even safety, might imperiously demand to be kept in
concealment.
The power itself is confided to the Executive of the Union, to him
who is, by the constitution, “the commander in chief of the militia,
when called into the actual service of the United States,” whose duty
it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and whose
responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is secured by the highest sanctions. He is necessarily constituted the
judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is
bound to act according to his belief of the facts.76

73. Id. at 24.
74. Id. at 30.
75. Justice Story went on to state that:
A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the complete
attainment of the object. The service is a military service, and the command of
a military nature; and in such cases, every delay, and every obstacle to an efficient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard the public interests. While subordinate officers or soldiers are pausing to consider whether
they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the evidence of the facts upon
which the commander in chief exercises the right to demand their services, the
hostile enterprise may be accomplished without the means of resistance. . . . If
a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the President upon his
own doubts as to the exigency having arisen, it must be equally the right of
every inferior officer and soldier; and any act done by any person in furtherance
of such orders would subject him to responsibility in a civil suit, in which his
defense must finally rest upon his ability to establish the facts by competent
proofs. Such a course would be subversive of all discipline, and expose the best
disposed officers to the chances of ruinous litigation.
Id. at 30-31.
76. Id. at 31.
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In other words, the President’s constitutional role vested him with
broad discretion to act in the interests of national security, and the
Court was not privy to the information necessary to second-guess the
Executive’s judgment in this area.
Looking at the relevant historical case law, beginning with Martin
and stretching into modern day, military deference comes in a variety
of “flavors.”77 In general, the Court’s use of military deference primarily occurs in two, sometimes overlapping, ways.78 First is a commitment by the Court to abide by the constitutional prescription of separation of powers, and an acknowledgement that the judiciary is the
branch with the least expertise in national security and war-related
issues. In these cases, the Court generally relies on the war power
provisions of the Constitution. Under Article I, Section 8, Congress
has the authority to declare war, fund and maintain the armed forces, and make rules governing the armed forces.79 And under Article
II, Section 2, the President is Commander in Chief of the armed
forces.80 Historically, this type of deference has been influential in
convincing the Court to abstain from reaching the merits of certain
cases as being outside the scope of proper judicial review.81 In other
77. The usual deference granted by courts to executive statutory interpretation is not
considered under the umbrella of military deference in this Article. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (outlining the test for when reasonable executive agency interpretations of statutes should be granted broad deference by
courts); see also Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and
Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 444-46 (2005) (arguing that administrative deference analysis under Chevron should be followed by courts when granting deference to
factual military determinations). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer,
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1086-87 (2008); Julian Ku & John Yoo,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 194-96 (2006) (discussing the role that Chevron-type
deference has played in modern national security cases).
78. But see, e.g., Barney F. Biello, Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers’ Rights: Is the
Principle of Deference A Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465, 474-77 (1989) (delineating a total of four distinct bases of military deference).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
81. Justice Story’s opinion in Martin is a good example. See also, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82-83 (1857). In Dynes, a Navy seaman filed suit on the basis
that he had been tried for a crime for which he had not been charged. Id. Refusing to reach
the merits of his case, the Dynes Court reiterated Congress’s military-related powers and
held that as long as a court-martial was properly convened and had jurisdiction over the
defendant, civil courts had no role in substantive review. Id. But see Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 63-64 (1957) (holding that despite international treaties in effect to the contrary,
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to subject civilians accompanying the armed
forces overseas to the Uniform Code of Military Justice during peace-time, and therefore,
infringing on their Fifth and Sixth Amendments rights); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866) (holding that the executive branch lacked the authority to try a
citizen accused of assisting the Confederacy in a military tribunal when regular courts
were in operation).
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cases, this justification failed to persuade the Court to abstain
completely but nonetheless played an important role in its level of
review or in its balancing of interests.82
The “separation of powers” deference argument has been influential in multiple cases involving the military’s infringement on civil
liberties. Perhaps the most maligned case in this line is the World
War II-era decision Korematsu v. United States,83 in which the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the military’s geographical exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry on the West
Coast.84 The Court purportedly balanced the interests of national
security and the due process rights of Japanese Americans, many of
whom were citizens. Ultimately persuasive for the Court were arguments from the military espousing the dangers of disloyal Japanese
Americans, grounded in the fact that when given the opportunity to
renounce allegiance to Japan subsequent to the exclusion, 5,000 Japanese Americans declined to do so.85 Although the Korematsu Court
announced a strict scrutiny standard of review,86 the Court’s holding
displayed a readiness to ascribe overwhelming weight to the government’s national security arguments, despite a lack of reasonable
proof of actual exigency or concrete risk. As discussed below, the
deference derived from separation of powers concerns is frequently
used in the context of national security and has been pertinent in the
Court’s GWOT cases.

82. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1968) (holding that a
federal law criminalizing the burning of draft cards was constitutional as an incidental
content-neutral restriction on speech, as the government had a substantial interest in
maintaining the integrity of the Selective Service system).
83. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
84. In Korematsu, Japanese persons who refused to obey the exclusion order, like Mr.
Korematsu, or who did not have the luxury of moving elsewhere, were detained in military
detention centers. Id. at 215-17. The Court limited its review to the exclusion order itself
and declined to rule on the constitutionality of the detention centers. See id. at 221-24. See
also Hirabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1942) (upholding a conviction for violating a military curfew order on Japanese Americans). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S.
283, 302, 304 (1944) (holding the U.S. government could not indefinitely detain a citizen
whom it did not suspect of subversion on the same day Korematsu was decided).
85. According to the military, it was impossible to segregate the disloyal Japanese American from the loyal in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, so necessity dictated total exclusion from strategically vulnerable West Coast areas. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
86. The Court stated:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
Id. at 216.
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The second main justification for deference is the recognition that
the military, as a unique war-fighting institution, has specific needs
for its own operation.87 In Mott, for example, the Court emphasized
the need for unquestioned obedience on the part of soldiers, necessitating a limited role for the civilian judiciary in interfering with a
commander’s decision.88 As discussed above, the Rostker Court largely
justified its deference on this basis.89 This “military needs” or
“military necessity” deference justification is common in cases involving service member’s rights and has become more influential to the
Court in fairly recent times.90 The military necessity justification
most frequently plays a role in interests-balancing analyses, allowing
the government to regulate behavior that would be unconstitutional
in the purely civilian context. In Goldman v. Weinberger,91 for instance, the Court upheld a military regulation prohibiting Jewish
service members from wearing a yarmulke in uniform, against a
First Amendment challenge.92 Likewise, in Parker v. Levy,93 the
Court upheld an Army officer’s criminal conviction for using language critical of the Vietnam war.94 In both cases, the Court recognized the unique nature of the military; specifically, the need for uniformity and obedience, and the importance of mission accomplishment. These same justifications can also be seen in civilian cases,
although less frequently and with seemingly less potency. For example, in Greer v. Spock,95 the Court upheld a military commander’s
87. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force
are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.”).
88. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 19, 30 (1827).
89. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
90. See John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161, 261-62 (2000) (tracing the history of judicial deference and finding this type’s most robust usage by the Burger Court).
91. 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986).
92. Id. at 507 (“The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps.”).
93. 417 U.S. 733, 761 (1974).
94. The Court stated:
While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection
granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.
Id. at 758.
95. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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right to forbid civilian political speeches and distribution of campaign
literature on a military installation.96 The Court held for the military,
stating that because allowing political speech on post would be a
detriment to military training, no constitutional violation had
occurred.97
To complicate matters, the above doctrinal flavors of deference
may be further parsed into the manner in which the Court applies
such deference. As discussed above, military and national securityspecific arguments variously convinced the Court to abstain from deciding the central merits of a case, played a decisive role in interestbalancing, and heavily swayed its conclusion when applying a given
standard of review.98 Another way in which deference colors military
cases, usually concurrently with the ways above, is through military
fact deference. Usually based in the Court’s acknowledgement that
Congress, the President, or the military itself possesses unique
knowledge or expertise in certain matters, the Court refrains from
judging the veracity, importance, or immanence of facts submitted by
the government.99 This manner of deference was evident in the
majority opinion of Rostker, as Justice Rehnquist accepted Congress’s
finding that the need for “military flexibility” justified the total exclusion of women from draft registration plans. Fact deference was
also dispositive in Korematsu, as the majority opinion accepted the
fact that 5,000 Japanese Americans had refused to renounce loyalty
to Japan as evidence that they played a serious threat to national
security, justifying their wholesale exclusion from the West Coast.100
The Court gave great deference not just to a quantifiable fact
proffered by the government, but also to the nexus between that fact,
the risk to national security, and subsequent need for military deference.101 As discussed below, relative deference given by the Court to
96. Id. at 839-40.
97. Id. at 839 (noting that the installation had not discriminated based on the content
of the anticipated speech—no political speech had ever been allowed on the installation).
But see United States v. Flowers, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972) (holding that the military could
not prohibit First Amendment activity in an area of post that had been “abandoned” to
public use).
98. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
99. For a historical study of fact deference, see generally Steven B. Lichtman, The
Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tradition of
Deference to the Military, 1918-2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907, 915 (2006).
100. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944). The majority came
to this conclusion despite wording from the same military report that referred to Japanese
persons as belonging “to ‘an enemy race’ ” whose “racial strains are undiluted,” plainly
indicating racial bias. Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
101. See Masur, supra note 77, at 454-57 (noting that the Korematsu Court failed to
meaningfully inquire into the military report and essentially abdicated its judicial role to
the “expertise” of the military).
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factual determinations by the military regarding the status and criminal liability of GWOT detainees was the cornerstone of those
cases.102
Judicial deference in military matters has been decisive in numerous historic cases, many times to the detriment of the preservation of
civil liberties. Partly as a result, the military deference doctrine itself
has been heavily criticized as being contrary to founding American
principles.103 Despite its consistent use of military deference, and its
dispositive effect in many controversies, the Court has never announced a test or set definitive guiding principles to be used in military deference cases. Indeed, the lack of guidance on this matter has
led to varying approaches by lower courts.104 Legal scholars and
practitioners have expressed frustration over the lack of Supreme
Court guidance on the military deference doctrine, calling for a more
authoritative standard of review in such cases.105
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S MODERN APPROACH
TO MILITARY DEFERENCE
In anticipating the nature of deferential treatment most likely to
be accorded in a modern constitutional challenge to the MSSA, it is
instructive to outline a framework of the Court’s modern approach to
deference cases. What follows is a brief examination of recent
Supreme Court cases related to military matters. All cases involve
controversies that pit national security or military-centric concerns
against the individual rights of civilians. Cases involving military
issues where the Court made a narrow ruling—when its decision was
based purely on statutory interpretation, for example—have been
omitted.106 Although the Court has continued to refrain from setting
102. For a full exploration of the principles behind national security fact deference, see
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1392-93, 139598 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case
Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1992); Stephanie A.
Levin, The Deference That is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the
Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1990); Karen A. Ruzic, Note, Military Justice and the
Supreme Court’s Outdated Standard of Deference: Weiss v. United States, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 265, 266 (1994).
104. See also Chesney, supra note 102, at 1434 (categorizing the approach to national
security fact deference, and understanding of its theoretical underpinnings, among courts
as inconsistent and troubling). See generally Gabriel W. Gorenstein, Note, Judicial Review
of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 389, 397-98, 400,
402-403 (1984).
105. See, e.g., Biello, supra note 78, at 481-82.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1153 (2014). In Apel, the respondent was barred from Air Force property because of misconduct, but violated the order by
demonstrating in the base’s protest area, at one point throwing blood on a sign for the in-

2017]

UNEQUAL LAW, UNEQUAL BURDEN

157

guidelines for its reliance on military deference, some general principles and trends may be gleaned from this recent case law.
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
In an early GWOT case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,107 an American citizen detained in Afghanistan by U.S. forces challenged his domestic
detention as an enemy combatant.108 Hamdi challenged his confinement on several grounds, including that the government had violated
his Fifth Amendment due process rights because he faced indefinite
detention without trial or access to counsel.109 In a four-person plurality opinion by Justice O’Connor,110 partially supported by two other
justices, the Court held that although the government did generally
have the power to detain a combatant for the duration of hostilities in
a conflict without criminal trial, the Fifth Amendment guaranteed an
American citizen the right to challenge the military’s combatant detention determination in front of a neutral decisionmaker.111 As envisioned by the plurality opinion, this review process could accommodate national security and war-fighting concerns put forth by the
government; namely, by allowing hearsay evidence and having a presumption favoring the military’s initial determination.112 Such a
compromise, in the eyes of the Court, would ensure the appropriate
balance of military concerns with the risk of erroneous deprivation of
the detainee’s liberty.113
The Court’s consensus was a far cry from the government’s advocated position, however. Justice O’Connor first rejected the governstallation. Id. at 1148. He was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 for reentering a military
area after having been ordered not to do so by a military commander. Id. at 1149. At issue
before the Court was whether the protest area, being a part of military property but at the
site of an easement, fell under the auspices of the statute. Id. at 1150. The Court concluded
that it did and upheld Apel’s conviction. Id. at 1153. Because the lower court had not ruled
on the constitutionality of whether the statute itself or as applied violated the First
Amendment, the Court reserved the constitutional issue for further proceedings. Id.
107. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
108. Id. at 511.
109. Id.
110. Justice Scalia dissented, in perhaps the least deferential opinion, arguing that in
the absence of a formal suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the government must
afford Hamdi a regular criminal trial. Id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a separate
dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter disagreed with the plurality that Congress had authorized Hamdi’s detention through the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force. Id. at 540-53 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 533 (majority opinion). This holding was the impetus for Congress creating
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which themselves were challenged in the Boumediene
case, discussed below.
112. Id. at 533-34.
113. Id. at 534.
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ment’s contention that the Court should abstain from deciding the
merits of Hamdi’s challenge because of separation of powers concerns.114 In its brief, the government espoused a very limited level
and scope of review over combatant status determinations made by
the military.115 In fact, the level of deference granted to the military
should be greater than in the usual wartime scenario, argued the
government, since the enemy intentionally refused to wear distinctive markings among the civilian population, therefore failing to distinguish themselves as combatants.116 The government also asserted
that if the Court expanded the factual examination of combatant
status determinations, it would negatively impair the ability of
troops on the ground to conduct military operations, as “[a]ttempting
to recreate the scene of Hamdi’s capture is inconsistent with the
practical reality that the troops in Afghanistan are charged with
winning a war and not preparing to defend their judgments in a U.S.
courtroom.”117 Arguing further, requiring service members and allies
to appear as witnesses for detainee status cases would not only detract from the war effort in Afghanistan, but would also be “demoralizing” for troops.118
In the plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor doubted the severity of
the risks outlined by the government. In discussing the Court’s role
in impacting military operations, she wrote: “We think it unlikely
that this basic process will have the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the Government forecasts.”119 Supporting
this assertion, Justice O’Connor wrote that the Hamdi holding only
applied in a long-term detention scenario, and the detainee protections outlined by the plurality did not apply to immediate situations
of apprehension on the battlefield.120 Noting that the government had
stipulated that collecting and storing information about battlefield
detainees was already part of military practice, the fact-finding burden created by the Court’s independent-review mandate would be
minimal, and interference with mission accomplishment therefore
would be low.121 As to the government’s argument that military personnel would be distracted from war-fighting with the threat of
future litigation about detention decisions, Justice O’Connor found
114. Id. at 597-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. The government had advocated a “some evidence” standard of proof for courts
reviewing such determinations. Id. at 598.
116. Brief for the Respondents at 31, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696).
117. Id. at 11.
118. Id. at 12.
119. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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little merit because of the limited scope of the anticipated tribunals.122 The narrow scope of these review tribunals—dealing solely
with the circumstances of the detainee’s detention—would not, in her
opinion, infringe upon military war-fighting conduct or strategy.123
Ultimately, the military-need arguments put forth by the government did not overcome the essential right of a citizen to meaningfully
challenge the military’s detention determination.124 In the absence of
an independent review process established by Congress and the military, courts would have the authority to conduct a meaningful consideration of detainees’ due process rights through habeas review.125
Compared to historic cases, including Korematsu, the Court in
Hamdi seemed much more willing to involve itself in the national
security controversy despite the separation of powers concerns.126
Further, Justice O’Connor evinced an unabashed readiness to call the
executive branch’s military expertise into doubt, downplaying the
actual risk she perceived to military operations. The plurality’s prescribed terms for future military proceedings also indicate a willingness to get intricately involved in the conduct of the military detention program. There was almost a complete rejection of fact deference
as it related to operational dangers. As related to the legitimacy of
executive combatant determinations, however, the plurality seemed
to take a balanced approach. Notable was the Court’s articulation of
the proper level of deference to apply, which it linked to the likelihood that an American citizen’s rights would be needlessly deprived.127 Justice O’Connor’s approach specifically counterbalanced
122. Id. at 535.
123. Id. In outlining the Court’s role in the challenge at hand, Justice O’Connor went
on to explain:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe
on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored
and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like
those presented here.
Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 534.
126. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2012).
Scheppele argues that the GWOT cases represent a watershed in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Under the “old deference” of WWII cases, such as Korematsu, the Court generally
erred on the side of preserving national security, permitting civil rights violations that
would never pass constitutional muster in peace time. Id. at 96-108. Beginning with the
GWOT cases, however, the Court took a much more active role in checking constitutional
war powers. Despite this change in the Court’s jurisprudence, however, the ultimate practical
effects of the GWOT cases were not overwhelmingly meaningful for the detainees. Id. at 169.
127. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
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deference to military-centric arguments against civilian rights, ultimately concluding that the military justifications were not of a sufficient magnitude to completely overcome the liberty rights at issue.128
Although the Court ultimately came to a middle ground through a
balancing of interests, making some procedural concessions based on
military need—including the protection of classified information—the
plurality opinion was mostly lacking in deferential language. As a
starting point for subsequent GWOT cases, however, Hamdi was a
relative high point of deference for the Court.
B. Rasul v. Bush (2004)
On the same day as it decided Hamdi, the Supreme Court also
handed down the decision in Rasul v. Bush.129 At issue in that case
was whether U.S. district courts had the jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions from Guantanamo Bay detainees.130 In the majority
opinion, Justice Stevens examined the history of the habeas statute
and Supreme Court precedent.131 The Court, ultimately holding that
district courts did indeed have jurisdiction, relied on narrow
statutory reasoning.132 Military deference did not appear to sway the
Court in its 6-3 holding or play even a small role in its analysis.
Although it is difficult to judge the Court’s deference perspective in
the case, as it was decided on narrow grounds, it is still important to
note the lack of any mention of deference from the majority opinion.
Not only did deference concerns not impact the majority opinion, but
they were apparently of so little import as to not warrant discussion.
Dissenting in the case, Justice Scalia alleged that the majority
misread precedent and dangerously disregarded risks that would
ultimately burden the military.133 Indeed, the government’s brief
128. See id. at 534-35.
129. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
130. Id. at 472-73.
131. Id. at 473-81.
132. The statute at issue was 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), which allows habeas petitions
from those who claim to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. at 473.
133. Justice Scalia wrote:
Today’s carefree Court disregards, without a word of acknowledgment, the
dire warning of a more circumspect Court in Eisentrager: “To grant the writ to
these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the seas
for hearing. This would require allocation for shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever
witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in
the present twilight between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war
effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the pres-

2017]

UNEQUAL LAW, UNEQUAL BURDEN

161

warned about the serious separation of powers issues inherent in
resolving Rasul and potentially negative ramifications in intruding
upon ongoing intelligence-gathering operations at Guantanamo
Bay.134 For Justice Scalia, the Court’s departure from the precedent
cases was especially troubling. According to Justice Scalia, the Court
was essentially changing the war-fighting rules mid-game because
the Executive relied on that precedent in creating the detention
scheme at issue.135
tige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It
would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than
to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to
account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the
result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”
Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
778-79 (1950)).
134. In its brief, the government specifically linked the judiciary’s interference with
resulting negative effects to the military’s effort to wage war on terror, stating that:
Exercising jurisdiction over habeas actions filed on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees would directly interfere with the Executive's conduct of the
military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters. The detention of captured combatants in order to prevent them from rejoining the enemy during
hostilities is a classic and time-honored military practice, and one that falls
squarely within the President's authority as Commander in Chief.
Brief for the Respondents at 42, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334 & 03-343). The government went on to warn that:
The intelligence-gathering operations at Guantanamo are an integral component of the military’s efforts to “repel and defeat the enemy” in the ongoing
military campaign being waged not only in Afghanistan but around the globe.
Any judicial review of the military’s operations at Guantanamo would directly
intrude on those important intelligence-gathering operations. Moreover, any
judicial demand that the Guantanamo detainees be granted access to counsel to
maintain a habeas action would in all likelihood put an end to those operations—a result that not only would be very damaging to the military’s ability to
win the war, but no doubt be “highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”
More generally, exercising jurisdiction over actions filed on behalf of the
Guantanamo detainees would thrust the federal courts into the extraordinary
role of reviewing the military’s conduct of hostilities overseas, second-guessing
the military’s determination as to which captured aliens pose a threat to the
United States or have strategic intelligence value, and, in practical effect, superintending the Executive’s conduct of an armed conflict-even while American
troops are on the ground in Afghanistan and engaged in daily combat operations.
Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
135. Justice Scalia wrote:
Departure from our rule of stare decisis in statutory cases is always extraordinary; it ought to be unthinkable when the departure has a potentially
harmful effect upon the Nation’s conduct of a war. The Commander in Chief
and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the internment of com-
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C. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2009)
The Supreme Court considered two more landmark detainee cases
following Rasul. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,136 Salim Ahmed Hamdan—
former chauffeur for Osama bin Laden—challenged the legality of the
U.S. military commission process, designed to try select Guantanamo
Bay detainees for war crimes.137 The government argued that the
Court should apply deference in several distinct ways. As a threshold
matter, the government submitted that the Court should apply judicial comity to the case and abstain from intervening in an on-going
military proceeding.138 In examining the arguments which would
weigh towards abstention, the Court followed the factors from Schlesinger v. Councilman.139 As the Court stated: “[M]ilitary discipline
and, therefore, the Armed Forces’ efficient operation, are best served
if the military justice system acts without regular interference from
civilian courts.”140 This factor did not weigh in the Government’s
favor in Hamdan, according to the Court, because Hamdan was not a
service member, and therefore military discipline concerns did not
apply.141 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted the Court’s seeming failure to examine other comity considerations at issue in Councilman;
namely, whether the case involved other “military necessities” or
“unique military exigencies,” which should weigh in the Court’s interference calculation.142 The majority viewed Councilman narrowly,
declining to look at broader deference considerations.
batants at Guantánamo Bay would not have the consequence of bringing the
cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs. . . . For this
Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration of
our military commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism of the worst sort.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
137. See id. at 567-70.
138. Id. at 585.
139. 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) (holding that federal courts should not intervene in a
criminal case when a service member has failed to exhaust his remedies in the military
justice system).
140. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 586 (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 752).
141. Id. at 587. The Court did acknowledge that abstention may be justified in some
future cases where, for example, detainees were seeking review of an ongoing military
commission when that commission was convened in proximity to the battlefield. Id. at 590.
142. Id. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757). Justice
Scalia noted that while the issue in Councilman was whether a military officer could be
tried in military court for selling marijuana off base, the issue in Hamdan involved the
petitioner “joining and actively abetting the murderous conspiracy that slaughtered thousands of innocent American civilians without warning on September 11, 2001.” Id. In his
opinion, the weighing of military necessity by the majority in Hamdan was woefully inadequate considering the precedent of Councilman.
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Interestingly, on the issue of comity, the Court found great similarity between Hamdan and Ex parte Quirin.143 Quirin involved eight
would-be German saboteurs who were captured on U.S. soil after
traveling by U-boat and landing in Long Island, New York and Florida.144 Confined and facing military commission for espionage, the
saboteurs filed habeas corpus petitions in a U.S. district court.145
Refusing to abstain from the case, the Supreme Court convened a
special term to consider the case on expedited review.146 The Quirin
Court stated that review was appropriate because:
[I]n view of the public importance of the questions raised by [the
cases] and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as
well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional
safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public
interest required that we consider and decide those questions
without any avoidable delay.147

In Quirin, the Court implicitly weighed the interests of civilian rights
with military need, determining that the countervailing liberty interests—even those of foreign nationals—overcame military arguments
for comity.148 Likewise, the Hamdan majority found those factors
compelling and abstention to be inappropriate in the case.
Turning to the merits of Hamdan’s challenge, the Court considered the legality of the U.S. military commission as designed by the
executive branch. The procedures for military commissions, the Court
determined, were dictated by both domestic and international law.
The Court interpreted Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ)149 as requiring that such commissions must, if “practicable,” follow the usual procedures of federal courts and be uniform
to other proceedings under the UCMJ—namely, courts-martial.150
Hamdan argued that the procedural rules of the commissions deviated substantially from both federal and military court procedures in
that they permitted the accused to be excluded from the proceedings,
143. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
144. Id. at 21.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id. at 19-20.
147. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 588 (second alteration in original) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19).
148. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. Considering the merits of the case, the Supreme Court
found that the pending charges and military tribunal were constitutional. All eight German saboteurs were convicted at military commission and sentenced to death. President
Roosevelt later commuted two of the sentences. See Aileen Jacobson, Nazi Saboteurs in the
Amagansett Sands, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/
nyregion/june-13-1942-saboteurs-land-in-amagansett-on-view-in-east-hampton.html.
149. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012).
150. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620.
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denied access to certain evidence, and applied substantially different
evidentiary rules.151
Through an executive order, President Bush determined that it
was “impracticable” to apply federal district court rules and principles of law to U.S. military commissions.152 As to that determination,
the Court “assume[d] that complete deference [was] owed.”153
However, as the President never made a similar declaration of impracticability for the rules of courts-martial, and because the Court
found nothing on the record which demonstrated that it would be
impracticable to apply such rules in Hamdan’s case,154 the commissions failed the requirements of Article 36. Even if the majority
would have considered the President’s impracticality justifications as
relevant for the purpose of diverging from federal court procedure,
the Court stated that the security justifications found therein were
too general.155 Because the President only noted the dangers of “international terrorism” in broad terms, it was not sufficiently specific
to satisfy the Court.156
In his dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s
assertion that the executive branch had not announced an “impracticality” need to diverge from Article 36’s requirements.157 He would
find effective declarations made by the Secretary of Defense and
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.158 In response to Justice
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 621.
Id. at 623.
Id.
The Court stated:

There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in securing
properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in applying the usual principles
of relevance and admissibility. Assuming, arguendo, that the reasons articulated in the President’s Article 36(a) determination ought to be considered in
evaluating the impracticability of applying court-martial rules, the only reason
offered in support of that determination is the danger posed by international
terrorism. Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan’s trial, any variance
from the rules that govern courts-martial.
Id. at 623-24 (footnotes omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 713 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Justice Thomas wrote:
On the same day that the President issued Military Commission Order No. 1,
the Secretary of Defense explained that “the president decided to establish military commissions because he wanted the option of a process that is different
from those processes which we already have, namely the federal court
system . . . and the military court system,” and that “[t]he commissions are intended to be different . . . because the [P]resident recognized that there had to
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Thomas, the majority stated that it was unwilling to grant deference
to comments made to the media by such officials.159 Going further,
the majority remarked that, regardless, the comments made by those
officials were not convincing because they also lacked specificity
regarding the dangers of using usual court-martial procedures for
detainees and instead only articulated generalized national security
concerns and the issue of disclosing classified material in court.160
Those justifications were deemed inadequate, however, as the
majority considered the deficiencies in commission procedure to far
exceed the scope of those bases.161
Here, the Hamdan majority set a limit on the nature and impact
of persuasive military needs justifications—refraining from accepting
a “necessity” argument made to the media by defense officials—in
addition to mandating that the justification itself have a strong
nexus to the challenged military action at issue. In essence, the
majority required the government to make specific connections between articulated military concerns and deficiencies in commission
procedure. As it was, the military justifications were inadequately
general and, therefore, not palatable for the majority.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, also noted that one of
the fundamental rights protected by military proceedings was the
right to be present.162 Withholding judgment on whether that difference was “contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ, as disallowed
by Article 36, the Court did state that “the jettisoning of so basic a
right cannot lightly be excused as ‘practicable.’ ”163 In making this
pronouncement, the Court appeared to make a comment on due
deference, making it contingent on the individual liberty at stake.
Because of the gravity of the individual right at issue, the required
be differences to deal with the unusual situation we face and that a different
approach was needed.” The President reached this conclusion because “we’re in
the middle of a war, and . . . had to design a procedure that would allow us to
pursue justice for these individuals while at the same time prosecuting the war
most effectively. And that means setting rules that would allow us to preserve
our intelligence secrets, develop more information about terrorist activities that
might be planned for the future so that we can take action to prevent terrorist
attacks against the United States. . . . [T]here was a constant balancing of the
requirements of our war policy and the importance of providing justice for individuals . . . and each deviation from the standard kinds of rules that we have in
our criminal courts was motivated by the desire to strike the balance between
individual justice and the broader war policy.”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 623 n.52 (majority opinion).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 624 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 839(c) (Supp. V 2000)).
163. Id.
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showing of military need was correspondingly great.164 The Court
thus established an apparent sliding scale of deference—where less
deference was due, and a requirement for a showing of military necessity was high—when the government has potentially infringed on
a fundamental liberty right.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority’s rejection of military necessity altogether as forming the basis of the
commissions. In criticizing Hamdan’s conspiracy charge, the majority
stated that “[t]he charge’s shortcomings are not merely formal, but
are indicative of a broader inability on the Executive’s part here to
satisfy the most basic precondition—at least in the absence of specific
congressional authorization—for establishment of military commissions: military necessity.”165 The majority went on to explain that
Hamdan’s commission was not convened by a commander on the
battlefield, but a retired general stationed at Guantanamo Bay.166
Further, according to Justice Stevens, the conspiracy charge was not
grounded in any acts committed in the heat of battle or the theater of
war, wherein the military would have a significant interest in trying
him swiftly.167 Finally, according to the record itself and noted by the
majority, it took the military almost three years to charge Hamdan
after detaining him.168 These factors indicated a complete lack of exigency and military need for the majority. For Justice Scalia, however,
the majority’s view of military necessity differed remarkably from
that of Congress and the Executive. In passing the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Congress authorized the President
to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [such as petitioner] he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001.169 Subsequently, President Bush issued an
executive order authorizing the detention of personnel captured in
the course of the conflict and establishing military commissions to try
detainees for war crimes.170 For Justice Scalia, it was audacious for
the Court to second-guess both Congress and the President on the
164. The Court went on to state that the Commissions system also violated international law—Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—because the Commissions were
not regularly constituted courts. Id. at 632. Therefore, even if the Executive had made an
impracticality determination in compliance with Article 36 of the UCMJ, the Commissions
as designed would likely still have been unlawful according to the Court.
165. Id. at 612.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 554.
170. Id. at 674 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R.
§ 1(e) (2001)).
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issue of military necessity.171 The majority, then, had wholeheartedly
rejected appeals to both separation of powers and military necessity
deference.
The Court in Hamdan seemed to take a much less deferential
approach to the government’s position than it had in Hamdi. For the
majority, less deference was due because of the serious civil liberty
concerns involved. The rejection of deference by the Hamdan Court
appears to be at least partly a result of the length of time that the
military had confined detainees. Justice Stevens pointedly rejected
military necessity arguments in considering the commissions, remarking that Hamdan and other detainees were now distanced from
the conflict by both time and geography.172 Comparing the result with
the outcome in Hamdi, it seems that not only the notion of military
necessity but the persuasive role of deference itself decreased along
with the relative decrease in exigency and uncertainty within the
war on terror. As a result, the majority in Hamdan gave little regard
to those deference arguments. Even if military needs justifications had
been valid at some point during the conflict, the bases for such justifications grew stale with time and distance. Through its analysis, the
Court directly refuted the relevance of military necessity to the legal
issues at hand—as the nexus between the commissions and warfighting itself was weak—and the appeal to deference was undermined.
D. Boumediene v. Bush (2008)
In the wake of the Court’s GWOT decisions, Congress continued
its efforts to curtail the ability of Guantanamo Bay detainees to enter
U.S. district courts. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),
Congress stripped away jurisdiction from U.S. district courts to hear
habeas corpus petitions from detainees at Guantanamo Bay completely.173 In Boumediene v. Bush,174 military detainee Lakhdar
Boumediene challenged the constitutionality of the MCA, alleging
that it infringed on his right to habeas corpus.175 Where the holding
in Rasul had been based on statutory habeas jurisdiction, now the
more pressing issue of detainee constitutional habeas rights was at
issue. The government argued that the law was constitutional because detainees held at Guantanamo Bay did not have a constitu-

171. Id. at 674-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 612.
173. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950 (2012)).
174. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
175. Id. at 732.
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tional right to habeas corpus.176 Even if some limited right did exist,
the government maintained that military tribunals established to
determine the legal status of detainees—Combat Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs)177—were adequate and effective substitutes for
habeas petitions.178
In determining the reach of the constitutional right of habeas corpus, the five-Justice majority relied on the precedent of Johnson v.
Eisentrager,179 a World War II-era case involving German soldiers
who had been tried extraterritorially by the U.S. military commission. The Eisentrager Court concluded that three factors should be
considered in determining whether a detained person held outside of
the United States may have the right to bring a habeas petition in a
U.S. district court: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee, and
the sufficiency of the process that made that determination; (2) the
nature of the location where the detention took place; and (3) the obstacles that would be created if detained personnel were granted entitlement to the writ.180 The three-factor test on which the Court relied balanced military necessity (i.e., how near to the heat of battle
the apprehension and tribunal took place, and possible negative ramifications on the mission) with the detained person’s liberties. In
other words, whether the tribunal to determine the detainee’s status
adequately protected those liberties.
It was on the third prong of the Eisentrager factors that the
government argued most vociferously that deference to the military
should be observed. In its brief, the government advocated an
approach aligned with Eisentrager, in which the Court acknowledged
that granting the writ to aliens held abroad would “hamper the war

176. Id. at 739. The right of habeas corpus may only be suspended by Congress in limited circumstances circumscribed by the Constitution. The Suspension Clause states, “The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
177. The tribunals were designed to make determinations regarding the detainees’
legal status—that is, if they were combatants that could be held for the duration of hostilities under domestic and international law. All Guantanamo Bay detainees were eventually
evaluated by a CSRT—unlike military commissions, which were designed to try detainees
for war crimes and used fewer than a dozen times as of early 2017. The CSRT tribunals
were created by Congress after the due process guidelines set forth by Justice O’Connor in
Hamdi. Although the Boumediene Court did not directly overrule Hamdi, it is difficult to
reconcile the two cases.
178. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771-72.
179. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the German soldiers did not have a right to
bring habeas petitions in U.S. Courts as they had been captured in China and kept in
German detention facilities).
180. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777).
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effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.”181 Additionally, relying on Eisentrager,
[I]t would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce
to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from military offensive abroad to the
legal defensive at home.182

While acknowledging that granting the habeas right to Guantanamo Bay detainees would force the government to incur additional monetary and administrative costs, as well as divert military
personnel from important duties, the 5-4 majority did not find these
concerns to be controlling in Boumediene. In the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy found that the government failed to provide a persuasive argument that the military mission would be compromised if
detainees were granted the habeas right.183 Focusing primarily on the
181. Brief for the Respondents at 19, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (Nos. 06-1195 & 061196).
182. Id. at 19-20.
183. The Court similarly dismissed concerns about the safety threat posed by the detainees themselves, as well as the possible repercussions on American-Cuban relations:
The Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at
Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to
hear the detainees’ claims. And in light of the plenary control the United States
asserts over the base, none are apparent to us.
The situation in Eisentrager was far different, given the historical context
and nature of the military’s mission in post-War Germany. . . . In addition to
supervising massive reconstruction and aid efforts the American forces stationed in Germany faced potential security threats from a defeated enemy. In
retrospect the post-War occupation may seem uneventful. But at the time Eisentrager was decided, the Court was right to be concerned about judicial interference with the military’s efforts to contain “enemy elements, guerilla fighters,
and ‘were-wolves.’ ”
Similar threats are not apparent here; nor does the Government argue that
they are. The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay consists of 45
square miles of land and water. The base has been used, at various points, to
house migrants and refugees temporarily. At present, however, other than the
detainees themselves, the only long-term residents are American military personnel, their families, and a small number of workers. The detainees have been
deemed enemies of the United States. At present, dangerous as they may be if
released, they are contained in a secure prison facility located on an isolated
and heavily fortified military base.
There is no indication, furthermore, that adjudicating a habeas corpus petition would cause friction with the host government. No Cuban court has jurisdiction over American military personnel at Guantanamo or the enemy combatants detained there. While obligated to abide by the terms of the lease, the
United States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no other sovereign for
its acts on the base. Were that not the case, or if the detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be
“impracticable or anomalous” would have more weight. Under the facts pre-
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absence of security threats faced by Guantanamo Bay, the Court
declined to accept a blanket—presumably unlimited by geography—
national security justification from the government. The relatively
stable security situation at Guantanamo Bay differed markedly from
the dangerous situation in post-war Germany, where the persons in
Eisentrager were detained, further curbing the government’s necessity argument.184 In his dissent, Justice Scalia strongly criticized the
majority for substituting the judgment of both the executive and
legislative branches in matters of national security with its own.185
By reframing the national security concerns carried by the case as
limited by the location of the detainees, rather than by the geography
of the global war on terror itself, the majority undercut the government’s military needs justification. As in Hamdan, the Court faulted
the government’s arguments as being too general and lacking a basis
in both gravity and exigency. Although military personnel may be
burdened by being heralded into U.S. district court as a result of a
detainee’s constitutional right to review, the Court did not consider
that to impact the overall military mission substantially. It was
convinced neither by administrative and financial burdens on the
military nor by arguments that granting the right to detainees would
seriously injure the morale of troops.186 In short, contrary to the government’s contentions, the majority found that allowing detainees’
recourse in U.S. courts did not actually pose substantial or pressing
risks to military operations.
The Court did not completely neglect the deference arguments put
forth by the government, however, and went on to caveat its holding
for reasons of military necessity. For one, if the detention facility at
issue were located more closely in proximity to a theater of war, or if
sented here, however, there are few practical barriers to the running of the
writ. To the extent barriers arise, habeas corpus procedures likely can be modified to address them.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769-70 (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. According to Justice Scalia:
The Court today decrees that no good reason to accept the judgment of the other two branches is “apparent.” “The Government,” it declares, “presents no
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.”
What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever. But the Court blunders in nonetheless. Henceforth, as today’s opinion makes unnervingly clear,
how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch
that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails.
Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
186. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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the Executive faced some kind of domestic exigency, the Court
expressed an openness to more heavily weigh a military deference
argument from the government.187 Furthermore, the Court stated
that reasonable time should be granted to the military in cases involving foreign citizens who are detained abroad, and a U.S. district
court should decline to entertain such a case in the immediate aftermath of detention.188 Moreover, in its initial screening and detention
determination, the government is due strong deference.189 In considering future cases, continued the Court, an important factor is
whether there are secondary processes available that meaningfully
check the government’s power.190 Deference did play an influential
role, then, in the Court offering the government some forms of future
leeway in acting in conformity with the its ruling.
After concluding that Guantanamo Bay detainees did, in fact,
have the constitutional right to habeas corpus, the Court also held
that the CSRTs established by the military were not effective substitutes for habeas petitions.191 The CSRTs did not guarantee detainees
the assistance of counsel, the government’s case was granted a presumption of validity, detainees were limited in calling favorable
witnesses, and the tribunal itself did not offer the full array of procedural outcomes that a habeas petition could.192 Justice Kennedy made
a nuanced pronouncement of what habeas hearings must entail for
these persons, however, and allowed some compromises in order to
reduce the burden that such proceedings would place on the military.
Accommodations may include consolidation of habeas claims to one
U.S. district court and established procedures to limit the dissemination of classified information.193 These accommodations, however, did
not appear to resolve the issue of requiring active duty military witnesses to appear in court—perhaps having been pulled from the field
of battle—a problem argued by the government in its brief and subsequently emphasized by Justice Roberts in his dissent.194
In dicta, the Court went on to describe, in sweeping terms, the
balance between judicial review and national security. In examining
its own role in maintaining this balance, the Court also focused on a
187. Id. at 770.
188. Id. at 793.
189. Id. at 793-94.
190. Id. at 779. Although the MCA allowed detainees recourse in filing reconsideration
petitions with the D.C. Circuit Court, the petitions would offer a level of review which was
less comprehensive than habeas.
191. Id. at 792.
192. Id. at 783-84.
193. Id. at 795-96.
194. See id. at 816 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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third consideration—individual liberty. The Court stated that while
national security depends upon the military, it is also dependent on
personal liberty and freedom from erroneous deprivations of
freedom.195 In evaluating its own judicial role as an important element of national security and ultimately as a check to the other two
branches, the Court emphasized the importance of taking into
account the individual liberty at stake. Again, the Court considered
individual rights as underpinning its determination to override the
Commander in Chief and Congress, granting them little separation of
powers deference in the process.
In explaining why the Court was not usurping or undermining the
role of Commander in Chief, the majority noted that within the constitutional separation of powers structure, the judicial authority to
hear challenges to executive determinations of combatant detention
were both supremely “legitimate” and “necessary.”196 That power was
even more essential because Boumediene had been in custody for
over six years.197 Not only was individual liberty at stake, but the
magnitude of that liberty’s deprivation was substantial and longlasting. This fact was important to the Court in resolving the separation of powers issue in the national security arena.198 Again, the
Court emphasized the importance of individual rights when considering the degree of deference due to the Executive.
Taken as a whole, the GWOT cases show a general unwillingness
by the Court to avoid the merits of national security cases because of
separation of powers concerns. The level of deference granted to government arguments was issue- and fact-specific, but several principles emerged. The level of relative deference given to both Congress
and the military appeared to shrink when the nexus to exigency was
low, and also when the individual rights at issue were serious. Most
importantly, however, the Court showed a consistent practice of
closely examining the “military need” facts offered by the government, particularly as they related to war-fighting concerns, often
ultimately disagreeing with the national security risks involved and
the likelihood of harm to military operations.

195. Id. at 797.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Previously in the decision, the Court appeared to hint that it took umbrage at the
fact that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay had been utilized for the very purpose
of evading judicial review. See id. at 765-66.
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E. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. (2006)
The doctrine of military deference was also at issue in several cases involving matters far removed from the war on terror. The Court
reaffirmed its own commitment to military deference apart from the
context of detainee rights in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights.199 In that case, the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)—an association composed of law schools and
law professors—challenged the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment.200 The Amendment required institutions of higher
learning to give equal campus access to military recruiters and other
employers or face a loss of federal funding.201 Although the Solomon
Amendment allowed exemptions for institutions with a long-standing
tradition of pacifism based on religious beliefs, it was otherwise universally reaching. Alleging a First Amendment violation, FAIR
argued that the Solomon Amendment forced institutions to choose
between freely exercising their right to decide whether to accommodate, and sometimes disseminate, a military recruiter’s message or
receive federal funding.202 The group was primarily concerned with
the military’s former “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” program, which violated
many school antidiscrimination policies.203
Beginning its discussion on the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, the unanimous Court204 cited Rostker, stating that “ ‘judicial deference . . . is at its apogee’ when Congress legislates under
its authority to raise and support armies.”205 Although Congress
chose to control military recruiter access on campuses through its
spending power rather than through direct legislation, in the Court’s
view, this fact did not reduce the degree of deference due to
Congress.206 In fact, the Court concluded that the requirements out-

199. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
200. Id. at 53.
201. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000). The original law stated only that schools must allow military recruiters access to their campuses. However, following Department of Defense interpretation and practice, Congress amended the statute to require equal treatment between
military recruiters and other employment recruiters. See H.R. REP. No. 108-443, pt. 1, at 6
(2004). Under the statute, if even one part of a university—such as a law school—refused to
allow recruiters equal access, the entire university would lose funding. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)
(2012).
202. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 53.
203. Id. at 68.
204. Justice Alito did not take part in the decision.
205. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 58 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
206. Id. at 58-59.
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lined in the law could have constitutionally been mandated by
Congress, even absent its spending power.207
In general, the Court stated that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct and only incidentally impacted speech.208 Although
schools might be required to send e-mails and print flyers advertising
a recruiter’s presence, as it would do these things for another employer, the inherent speech elements would be only incidental to the
conduct.209 Moreover, according to the Court, this situation was not
similar to precedent cases where the Court found “forced speech” as
objectionable, such as forcing a student to pledge allegiance to the
flag,210 or mandating that a Jehovah’s Witness display a religiously
offensive message on a license plate.211 In fact, positioning FAIR in
line with those First Amendment cases, wrote the Court, had the
potential to trivialize the serious freedoms protected by those precedents.212 In any case, the law did not dictate the content of speech
and did not result in a requirement that schools endorse a specific
message.213 Importantly, noted the Court, schools were free to express
opinions contrary to military policy.214 Disagreeing with a central
argument put forth by FAIR, the Court also stated that schools could
not comply with the law by equally excluding all employment
recruiters that violated school nondiscrimination policies.215
In the lower ruling, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Solomon Amendment’s burden on speech was greater than
necessary to further the government’s interest in military recruiting.216 The Third Circuit reasoned that the military had alternative
means to accomplish its goal, such as loan repayment programs and
media advertisements.217 In response, the Supreme Court first disagreed with the Third Circuit’s legal standard, stating that an incidental burden on speech was permissible as long as the neutral law
promoted a substantial government interest that would be achieved

207. Id. at 59.
208. Id. at 62.
209. Id.
210. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the
First Amendment prohibited schools from forcing students to recite the pledge of allegiance).
211. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire could
not force residents to bear a license plate with the state motto “Live Free or Die”).
212. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62.
213. Id. at 65.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 56.
216. Id. at 67.
217. Id.

2017]

UNEQUAL LAW, UNEQUAL BURDEN

175

less effectively without the regulation.218 Here, the law promoted the
substantial government interest in raising and supporting the Armed
Forces, and the law added to the effectiveness of military recruitment.219 Then, disagreeing with the outcome of the Third Circuit, the
Court stated that the fact that there may be other adequate ways of
raising an army and providing for a navy was a separate question and
a judgment best made by Congress, not the judiciary.220 The Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment.
Although the unanimous Court referred to military deference at
the outset, the opinion is not clear on how or to what degree deference was influential in its holding. The legal test used by the Court
in Rumsfeld, as well as other incidental speech infringement cases,
came from another military case in which deference was used.221
Notably, Rumsfeld involved the free speech interests of institutions,
rather than individuals. The Court also stressed the idea that universities possessed the meaningful choice to violate the terms of the
law and face loss of federal funding. The individual liberty interest at
stake in the case, then, was quite limited.
F. United States v. Alvarez (2012)
Conversely, the Court did not favor military deference arguments
in another recent First Amendment case where more serious individual rights were implicated, United States v. Alvarez.222 During a
municipal board meeting in California, new board member Xavier
Alvarez falsely stated that he was a retired Marine and had been
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.223 Alvarez was later convicted in federal court for violating the Stolen Valor Act of 2005,224
which made it a crime to falsely represent having been awarded any
military decoration or medal.225 In his appeal, Alvarez argued that

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (first citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13; then citing Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981)).
221. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
222. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
223. Id. at 713-15.
224. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2013).
225. The law stated, in relevant part:
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR
MEDALS––Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for
the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
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his lie was protected speech under the First Amendment, and therefore, the portion of the Stolen Valor Act under which he was convicted was unconstitutional.226 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed his conviction.
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government relied heavily
on the U.S. military’s strong interest in prohibiting deceptive speech
about military awards.227 The law itself listed congressional findings
that outlined specific concerns regarding false decoration claims:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Fraudulent claims surrounding the receipt of the Medal of Honor, the distinguished-service cross, the Navy cross, the Air Force
cross, the Purple Heart, and other decorations and medals awarded
by the President or the Armed Forces of the United States damage
the reputation and meaning of such decorations and medals.
(2) Federal law enforcement officers have limited ability to prosecute
fraudulent claims of receipt of military decorations and medals.
(3) Legislative action is necessary to permit law enforcement officers
to protect the reputation and meaning of military decorations and
medals.228

In addition to harming the prestige and recognition due to current
service members and veterans, the government argued that false
award representations had pernicious effects on the operation of the
military. Citing testimony of a high-ranking military official before
the House Armed Services Committee, the government contended
that false representations of that kind undermined “morale, mission
accomplishment, and esprit de corps within the military.”229 In detailing its compelling interest in the law, the government also asserted
that the integrity of the military awards program was perhaps even
more essential during times of conflict because such decorations
encouraged brave deeds and helped sustain troops in the face of personal loss.230 Noting why the Stolen Valor Act was necessary to

(c) ENHANCED PENALTY FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR.––(1) IN GENERAL––If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of
Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that subsection, the offender shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
226. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715.
227. Brief for the United States, Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (No. 11-210).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2013).
229. Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 14.
230. In its brief, the government contended:
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accomplish the government’s goal in protecting the integrity of the
awards system, the government cited Congress’s findings that fraudulent claims about the receipt of military decorations damage the
reputation of those decorations.231 The government thus offered strong
“military needs”-based deference justifications to the Supreme Court.
The Court considered these claims in its opinion, but in a 6-3 decision ultimately held that the charged provision of the Stolen Valor
Act was an unconstitutional limitation on speech. In a plurality opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Kennedy stated that the
Act amounted to a content-based restriction on speech and that
deception was not one of the several discrete categories of traditionally
nonprotected speech.232 As to the content-based strict scrutiny analysis, although the government’s interest in ensuring the respect and
esteem of service members was “beyond question,” the regulation ultimately did not pass muster under exacting scrutiny.233 Strict scrutiny required the government to not only prove a compelling
interest but also to prove that the restriction was actually necessary
to achieve its interest.234 The government, according to the plurality,
failed to prove that false claims such as those made by Alvarez
actually tended to dilute the perception of military awards in general.235 A common-sense causal link, articulated by the military and
endorsed by Congress, was not sufficient for the Court. The plurality
The award of military honors is particularly important during wartime. For
instance, as General George C. Marshall wrote in describing his advocacy during World War II for the creation of the Bronze Star, the medal would be used
to “sustain morale and fighting spirit in the face of continuous operations and
severe losses.” Indeed, the importance of medals in fostering these values
among service members has been recognized since the very first honors were
created. General Washington, in establishing the first valor award, explained
that it would “cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well as . . . foster
and encourage every species of military merit.” Similarly, when Congress
created the Medal of Honor during the Civil War, the bill’s sponsor explained
that the provision “need[ed] no explanation,” as creating the honor would
ensure that “the men in Navy shall be encouraged to brave deeds,” and would
be more effective in that regard than promotions and other incentives.
Id. at 38-39 (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 6.
232. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716-22 (2012).
233. Id. at 725-26. The Court also concluded that the government did not use the least
restrictive means to accomplish its objectives. Id. at 729-30. Specifically, Congress could
have directed the creation of a database that could be used to cross-check claims of military
decorations. Id. The dissenting Justices, citing the Office of Undersecretary of Defense,
Report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on a Searchable Military
Valor Decorations Database, stated that such a system would be impracticable. Id. at 74344 (Alito, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 725.
235. Id. at 725-26.
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suggested that intentional counter-speech condemning false claims of
military valor could result in satisfying the governmental interest.236
Moreover, wrote Justice Kennedy, because the awarding of high-level
honors such as the Medal of Honor, for example, was accompanied by
media coverage and great acclaim, the risk of false claims being believed was actually low.237 In making this holding, the Court rebuffed
the significance of the congressional finding of fact noted above;
namely, that false claims are a legitimate problem and do indeed
damage the reputation and perception of military decorations.
According to the plurality, there was no general exception to First
Amendment protection for false statements.238 The plurality declined
to include false claims of military decorations with other categories of
false speech that it had deemed unprotected in previous cases because those categories all included some form of cognizable harm.239
Where defamation, fraud, false commercial speech, and other examples all carried the consequences of legally recognized harm—such as
invasion of privacy or tending to cause unnecessary litigation—the
plurality was not persuaded that stolen valor incidents resulted in
similar harm.240 Moreover, according to Justice Kennedy, stolen
valor claims were not tantamount to perjury, which had the potential
to undermine the integrity of the judicial system.241 Nor were the
negative effects of stolen valor of a comparable magnitude to crimes
of falsely impersonating a government officer, which tended to denigrate the integrity of government processes.242 The plurality suggested that Congress could enact a more narrowly tailored law that
would only ban falsehoods intended for monetary or other tangible
gain.243 The above analysis and suggestions show that the plurality
implicitly rejected another of the government contentions—that false

236. Id. at 725-29.
237. Id. at 727-29. Justice Kennedy did not explain how this line of reasoning would
apply for the great majority of lesser medals that are awarded by the military, however.
238. Id. at 716-18 (“This comports with the common understanding that some false
statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.”).
239. Id. at 718-20.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 720-22.
242. Id.
243. Id. (noting a history of such laws in the country such as criminal fraud). Indeed, as
a result of Alvarez, Congress passed the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, which limited criminal
liability for falsely claiming military medals only to higher-ranking and combat-related
decorations, such as the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and only
when the claim was made for material gain. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 704 (2013).
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statements about military decoration have measurable adverse
effects on military operations, equivalent to a material harm.244
In a separate concurring opinion joined by Justice Kagan, Justice
Breyer stated that the Stolen Valor Act failed to pass intermediate
scrutiny, as it was not adequately tailored to achieve its objective and
operated to cause disproportionate constitutional harm.245 Recognizing that many statutes throughout history had made certain false
statements unlawful, Justice Breyer caveated that those statements
were always accompanied by specific categories of harm: when harm
was to identifiable victims; when tangible harm to others was especially likely; and when a certain type of lie was particularly likely to
produce harm.246 Again, the concurring Justices rejected the notion
that military valor lies cause significant harm, warranting inclusion
in one of those categories—despite the congressional testimony of
military officials to the apparent contrary.
In these two recent cases, the Court appeared to resort to military
deference when the law at issue had only an incidental effect on individual rights (e.g., the Solomon Amendment), but declined to rely
heavily on deference when the law had a potentially strong impact on
individual rights and the nexus to military operations—at least in
the Court’s opinion—was low. As in the GWOT cases, the majority of
Justices were willing to evaluate the military necessity contentions
made by the government and deemed them unpersuasive.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE APPLICATION
A careful examination of the modern Supreme Court cases shows
several trends. First, in general, the Court has not been sympathetic
to calls by the government to either abstain from deciding the merits
of individual rights cases or use a markedly lowered level of review,
justified by “separation of powers” deference concerns. Most importantly, this review reveals a tendency on the part of the majority
of sitting Justices to closely evaluate the government’s articulated
military need arguments and the facts underlying those justifications. In Boumediene, for example, Justice Kennedy unflinchingly
rejected the idea that the Court’s holding would significantly hamper
military operations in the theater of war. Likewise, in Alvarez, the
244. Conversely, courts have, for example, upheld laws criminalizing impersonation of
a government officer, even when the defendant did not have fraudulent intent or receive
anything of value. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 699 F.2d 177, 178-80 (4th Cir. 1983).
Congress’s goal in passing the law criminalizing impersonation of a government officer was
not only to prevent fraud, but also to maintain “the general good repute and dignity” of
service to the government. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943).
245. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
246. Id.
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Court stated that Congress’s finding of military valor harm as denigrating the public perception of military decorations was not
adequately supported. The Court has shown a readiness to judge the
merits of the government’s military need arguments and dismiss
them as being not likely, not germane, or of insufficient importance
to be persuasive. This is true even when the arguments were
endorsed by legislative findings, as they were in Alvarez. Not only
were underlying facts themselves fair game for the Court, but the
nexus between those alleged facts and the resulting need for judicial
deference was frequently rejected. This was true even when the government’s argument declared a threat to military operations and
war-fighting abilities. In Hamdan, for example, the plurality
acknowledged the military operational concerns before the Court but
noted that the link between the military commissions at issue and
the claimed operational needs in the GWOT conflict were weak. In
considering the nexus between military need and the legal issue at
hand, exigency was a primary concern in the Guantanamo cases, especially as the military’s involvement in the war on terror became
prolonged. 247 In general, when the nexus to military need was low, so
was the level of deference.
Frequently, Justices specifically judged the persuasiveness of military deference arguments as inversely related to the relative weight
of the individual rights at issue. This trend did not appear to be limited to war-time cases, as the Court showed a similar willingness to
dissect the government’s military deference arguments in Alvarez,
pitting them against serious First Amendment concerns. When serious civil liberty deprivation was anticipated, generalized concerns
about national security and the interruption of military operations
were not persuasive for the majority of Justices.
The modern Court has shown a pattern of reduced deference in
both “flavors” of military deference, as compared to the Court in
Rostker. In applying these general principles to a future challenge to
the MSSA, the most significant effect is in the Court’s willingness to
challenge not only the basis of military need and national securitytype justifications, but its readiness to closely examine the actual
severity, immanence, and likelihood of such operational concerns.
This applies to not only arguments made by the government in
247. In an interesting article, Israeli legal scholars trace the decline of military deference shown by the Israeli Supreme Court during an extended period of hostilities (19902005). The authors posit that the decline is due to several factors, including repeated exposure to unnecessary infringement by the military on individual liberties and a loss of military urgency which undermines deference arguments. Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman,
Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished Deference to the Military: Lessons from Israel,
35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919 (2010).
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general, but also specifically includes congressional findings as well
as military testimony. It is impossible to predict, with any degree of
certainty, the actual arguments that would be presented to the Court
in a future challenge to the MSSA. Based on modern precedent, however, the majority of Justices would not hesitate in taking a hard look
at the evidence submitted on behalf of military needs justifications in
assessing the adequacy and importance of those arguments in a due
process analysis. A poorly defended appeal to military “flexibility,” for
example, would likely not pass muster with the modern Court.
Also, based on recent cases, the use and extent of military deference is likely to be contingent on the gravity of the individual rights
at issue. The liberties at stake in the all-male MSSA are serious and
far-reaching. As noted previously, draftees served in large numbers
during multiple conflicts during the twentieth century. At a high
mark, conscripts made up approximately 62% of the American force
in World War II, where over 290,000 total U.S. service members died
in action.248 In Vietnam, the last instance of conscripted service,
draftees comprised more than 25% of total American troops,249 where
American troop battle deaths totaled over 47,000.250 Individual interests are not limited to war service, however. Men who fail to register
with the Selective Service, as required by the MSSA, face potential
criminal penalties,251 as well as a loss of various privileges, including
access to federal job training and student financial assistance,252 civil
service appointments,253 and U.S. citizenship.254 Many states also tie
eligibility to state financial assistance and the ability to attend instate colleges and universities to the registration requirements of the
MSSA.255 Because of the great civil liberty concerns at issue, it is likely that the Court would use a limited version of judicial deference.
Although the above analysis has been limited in scope to the
Court’s treatment of civilian rights vis-à-vis a call for military defer248. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AMERICA’S WARS FACT SHEET (2017),
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7QMM-RZZW] (listing total American troop numbers for each conflict).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See 50 U.S.C. § 3811(a) (2012). There have been no prosecutions for failing to register with the Selective Service since 1986. KAMARCK, supra note 14, at 18.
252. Enforcement of Military Selective Service Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 748
§ 1113 (1982).
253. 5 U.S.C. § 3328 (2012).
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).
255. The Selective Service System maintains a list of state penalties by jurisdiction.
See Other Legislations by States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, SELECTIVE SERV.
SYS., https://www.sss.gov/Registration/State-Commonwealth-Legislation/Other-Legislations
[https://perma.cc/M52M-GYWU] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).
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ence, it is also instructive to how the Court may treat future litigation involving service members.256 Such likely future cases may
involve challenges to the Feres doctrine257—which effectively bars active duty service members from suing the federal government in tort
actions, most significantly in medical malpractice claims—as well as
to military rules that inhibit certain religious practices.258 This Article’s analysis is particularly instructive when Congress and the military disagree on an issue, as it indicates the high degree to which the
Court would examine the deference justifications and factual assertions of each.

256. The Court has never articulated a different standard for military deference in
cases of civilian versus service member rights, although some authors have called for such
a distinction. See, e.g., Oberwetter, supra note 44, at 196-201. As the Court has not considered a service member rights case in years, it is difficult to predict whether its treatment
would differ substantially from the cases discussed above.
257. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that the government was
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence leading to the serious injury or
death of three service members).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 420 (2016) (holding that a Marine
superior’s orders to remove bible verses from a work area was lawful, and that appellant
failed to assert a prima facie defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). As the military is now under a strict scrutiny standard of review
for religious expression and accommodation cases involving service members, the issue of
the scope of service member free religious exercise under the First Amendment appears
generally ripe for judicial review. See DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION, NO. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION
OF
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (2009),
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130017p.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K9HA-N5M4] (incorporating statutory changes from RFRA).

